Complexity theory and centrality measures

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
The Big Challenge Facing Risk Analysis

Dependencies
Interdependencies

+

Uncertainties
Unknown unknowns

- The systems become more integrated and interconnected
- The consequences of some events have not been foreseen

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Reliability and Risk Engineering

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Critical Infrastructures

Large-scale Technical Networks

Introduction and Problem Description (I)

- Infrastructure systems provide essential goods and services to the industrialized society including **transport**, **water**, **communication** and **energy**

- A disruption or malfunction often has a significant economic impact and potentially **propagates** to other systems due to **interdependencies**

- Wide-area breakdowns of such large-scale engineering networks are often **caused by technical equipment failures** and their **coincidence in time** which eventually result in a series of fast cascading component outages

- Illustrative examples are a number of large **electric power blackouts** and **near-misses** as has been increasingly experienced in the last few years

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Introduction and Problem Description (II)

> How can we quantify the reliability of infrastructures and **assess the vulnerability** to such large-area breakdowns?

Basic problem: Infrastructures are highly complex and interdependent systems, consisting of an **enormous number of components.**
Classic reliability analysis methods are limited due to the **state space explosion**

Example: Consider a system of N=20 components with
up state and down state. A "state enumeration approach",
such as a complete Markovian chain would have to consider
$2^N = 2^{20} \sim 10^6$ system states!

Approach 1: *Simulate the systems realistically by means of extensive modeling methods, including physical laws and operational dynamics.*

Introduction and Problem Description (III)

Approach 2:   *Use highly simplified models in order to understand the* ***basic mechanisms*** *leading to infrastructure breakdowns. In this respect* ***network theory*** *allows for gaining valuable qualitative knowledge about the basic functioning of infrastructure systems, being networks in nature.*

However, due to its highly simplifying approach, network theory cannot replace more detailed reliability analysis methods.

It rather serves as a first **screening analysis**, whereas the findings, e.g. robustness of topology, may serve as an *input* for detailed reliability studies.

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
Real Networks

Network Models

Many simplifying assumptions

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What you will learn today…

- Know the characteristics and representation of complex networks by Complex Network Theory

  - Global and Local Properties

  - Exponential Networks vs. Scale-Free Networks

- How to perform the network static structural analysis

  - Unweighted

  - Weighted

- Compute the system vulnerability to element removal

- Identify the centrality of elements in the structure

  - Centrality measures, bottlenecks

- How to Model Cascading Failures Propagation in Network Systems

  - How to Identify Cascade-safe Operating Margins

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Complex Graph/Network - Definitions

- A complex graph contains many different subgraphs

- A complex graph is a graph whose structure is irregular, complex and dynamically evolving in time

- All complex graphs contain a medium number of links: both very sparse graphs and nearly fully connected graphs are not complex

- Complex graphs have non-trivial topological features: heavy tail in the degree distribution, a high clustering coefficient, assortativity or disassortativity among vertices, community structure, and hierarchical structure

- As opposed to regular lattices

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Quantifying Complexity of Different Networks

Fig. 4. Complexities of different test graphs.

T. Wilhelm, J. Kim (2008). "What is a complex graph?". *Physica A* **387**: 2637–2652.

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Different Types of Analysis

Network static structure analysis

Topological analysis

Weighted analysis

Dynamic modeling of cascading failures propagation in network systems

Identification of cascade-safe operating margins

Criticality indicators in failure cascade processes

Single system

Systems of systems

Network Characteristics: Some Basic Notations

- A network (or **graph**) is a set of N **nodes** (or **vertices** or **sites**) connected by L **links** (or **edges** or **bonds**)
- **G**(N,L): arbitrary graph of **order** N and **size** L
- Networks with undirected links are called **undirected networks** (a), those with directed links are called **directed networks** (b)

(a)   (b)

- The total number of connections of a node i to its nearest neighboring nodes is called its **degree** k_i

Network Representation: Adjacency Matrix

- The adjacency matrix **A** provides a complete description of a network
- Consider a network with *N* nodes labelled by their index *i* (*i*=1,…,*N*). Then the adjacency matrix is a *N x N* matrix with elements a_{ij}:

    if the network is undirected:

 $a_{ij} = a_{ji}$, $a_{ij} = 1$ *if there exists a link between node i and j*

                                    $a_{ij} = 0$ *otherwise*

    if the network is directed:

    $a_{ij} \neq a_{ji}$, $a_{ij} = 1$ *if there exists a link leaving node i and going to node j*

                                      $a_{ij} = 0$ *otherwise*

- Examples of undirected graphs:

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
$$k_i = \sum_j a_{ij}$$

Network Characteristics: Degree distribution

The **degree distribution** *P(k)* gives the probability that any randomly chosen vertex has degree *k*.

Poisson

$$P(k) = \frac{e^{-\alpha}\alpha^k}{k!}, \quad \text{where } \alpha = \overline{k}$$

Exponential

$$P(k) \propto e^{-k/\alpha}, \quad \text{where } \alpha = \overline{k}$$

Power law

$$P(k) \propto k^{-\gamma}, \quad k \neq 0$$

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
Examples of typical degree distributions

Illustration of network architectures. Left: random graph (**<u>Poisson</u>**), right: scale-free network (**<u>power law</u>**).

Source: Strogatz, S. H., Nature 410, 268-276 (2001)

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Degree distributions – WWW

FIG. 2. Degree distribution of the World Wide Web from two different measurements: □, the 325 729-node sample of Albert *et al.* (1999); ○, the measurements of over 200 million pages by Broder *et al.* (2000); (a) degree distribution of the outgoing edges; (b) degree distribution of the incoming edges. The data have been binned logarithmically to reduce noise.

Source: Albert, R., Barabàsi, A.: Statistical Mechanics of Complex Networks, Rev. Mod. Phys., Vol. 74 (2002)

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Degree distributions – Electric Power Systems

Cumulative distribution of the node degrees for the high-voltage 115 − 765 kV North American power grid. The model represents the power grid as a network of 14,099 nodes (substations) and 19,657 edges (transmission lines).

Source: R. Albert, I. Albert, G.L. Nakarado Structural vulnerability of the North American power grid Phys. Rev. E, 69 (2004), p. 025103(R)

Cumulative distribution of the node degrees for the high-voltage transmission networks in Italy (full circles), Spain (diamonds) and France (squares). The empty circles represent the Italian „fine-grain" network (from 380kV down to the distribution level).

Source: V. Rosato*, S. Bologna, F. Tiriticco*: Topological properties of high-voltage electrical transmission networks, Electric Power Systems Research, Vol. 77, 2007

Network Characteristics: Shortest Path (I)

Shortest Path between node 107 and 310

Assumption: the communication/service between two nodes is routed along the shortest path

Different *algorithms* are used to find the shortest path d_{ij} between two nodes i and j, e.g. Floyd-Warshall algorithm, Dijkstra's algorithm

Characteristic path length: average of all shortest paths in the network:

$$L = \frac{1}{N(N-1)} \sum_{i \neq j} d_{ij}$$

Average distance which has to be covered to reach the majority of nodes in the graph. Global property: typical separation between two nodes

Its value becomes infinity in case of a network splitting, due to e.g. disruption.

Network diameter: $d = \max_{i,j} d_{ij}$

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Shortest path length distribution $P(d_{ij})$

Most probable distance to travel : L = 20 stops

Maximum distance to travel: d = 55 stops

Network Characteristics: Shortest Path (II)

- Find the shortest path matrix for these undirected graphs:

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
$$
\begin{array}{c}
\mathbf{d_1}\ \mathbf{d_2}\ \mathbf{d_3}\ \mathbf{d_4} \\
\begin{array}{c}
\mathbf{d_1} \\
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\mathbf{d_4}
\end{array}
\begin{pmatrix}
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2 & * & 2 & 1 \\
2 & 2 & / & 1 \\
1 & 1 & 1 & +
\end{pmatrix}
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$$

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
Floyd-Warshall Algorithm

FLOYD-WARSHALL'(W)

1    $n = W.rows$
2    $D = W$
3   **for** $k = 1$ **to** n
4   **for** $i = 1$ **to** n
5   **for** $j = 1$ **to** n
6               $d_{ij} = \min(d_{ij}, d_{ik} + d_{kj})$
7   **return** D

all intermediate vertices in $\{1, 2, \ldots, k-1\}$ all intermediate vertices in $\{1, 2, \ldots, k-1\}$

p_1 $\qquad$ k $\qquad$ p_2 $\qquad$ j

i

p: all intermediate vertices in $\{1, 2, \ldots, k\}$

Network Characteristics: Clustering Coefficient (I)

- How interlinked are my friends?

The clustering coefficient of node i, C_i, measures the density of connections around a particular node i. Suppose you (node i) have k_i close friends (your first neighbors)

If they all are again friends among themselves there will be

$$C_{max} = \binom{k_i}{2} = \frac{k_i!}{(k_i - 2)! \cdot 2!} = \frac{k_i \cdot (k_i - 1)}{2}$$

links between them. Suppose that in reality there are only y connections between them. C_i will be

$$C_i = \frac{y}{C_{max}} = \frac{2 \cdot y}{k_i \cdot (k_i - 1)}$$

$$C_i = \frac{\text{Number of edges connecting the neighbours of } i}{\text{Max possible number of edges connecting the neighbours of } i, \ \frac{k_i(k_i-1)}{2}}$$

$$C = \frac{1}{N} \sum_i C_i$$

The **average** clustering coefficient C of a network is a measure of local connectivity. $C = 1$ for a fully-connected graph, and $C = 0$ for a complete sequential graph, i.e. a ring

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Network Characteristics: Clustering Coefficient (II)

$$C_{max} = \binom{4}{2}$$
$$= \frac{4!}{(4-2)! \cdot 2!}$$
$$= \frac{4 \cdot 3 \cdot 2}{2 \cdot 2}$$
$$= 6$$

How would you calculate the clustering coefficient for the white node?

Large values of *C* would be welcome for the robustness of the connectivity: a node removal disconnecting two portions of the system would be overcome by simply passing onto adjacent working nodes through short-range neighboring nodes

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Exponential Networks - Small-World Property

- Good global and local connectivity (local robustness due to clusters and global accessibility due to shortcuts among clusters)
- Characteristic scale (exponential decrease of the degree distribution)

- <u>Less vulnerable to malicious attacks (no preferential nodes), tolerant to random faults</u>

- They can be build using the Erdős-Rényi and Watts-Strogatz models

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
Power-Law Networks - Scale-Free Networks

- No characteristic scale in degree distribution (power law decrease) $P(k) \propto k^{-\gamma}, \ k \neq 0$

- Few highly connected nodes

- <u>Robustness to random faults but vulnerability to targeted malicious attacks (due to the highly-connected hubs)</u>

- Scale-free networks are build from:
  - Growth process
  - Preferential attachment of new nodes to already well-connected nodes

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
Characteristics of Real-life Networks

	Network	Type	N	L	$\bar{k}$	ℓ	γ	C
Social	film actors	undirected	449 913	25 516 482	113.43	3.48	2.3	0.78
	company directors	undirected	7 673	55 392	14.44	4.60	–	0.88
	math coauthorship	undirected	253 339	496 489	3.92	7.57	–	0.34
	physics coauthorship	undirected	52 909	245 300	9.27	6.19	–	0.56
	biology coauthorship	undirected	1 520 251	11 803 064	15.53	4.92	–	0.60
	telephone call graph	undirected	47 000 000	80 000 000	3.16		2.1	
	email messages	directed	59 912	86 300	1.44	4.95	1.5/2.0	0.16
	email address books	directed	16 881	57 029	3.38	5.22	–	0.13
	student relationships	undirected	573	477	1.66	16.01	–	0.001
	sexual contacts	undirected	2 810				3.2	
Information	WWW nd.edu	directed	269 504	1 497 135	5.55	11.27	2.1/2.4	0.29
	WWW Altavista	directed	203 549 046	2 130 000 000	10.46	16.18	2.1/2.7	
	citation network	directed	783 339	6 716 198	8.57		3.0/–	
	Roget's Thesaurus	directed	1 022	5 103	4.99	4.87	–	0.15
	word co-occurrence	undirected	460 902	17 000 000	70.13		2.7	0.44
Technological	Internet	undirected	10 697	31 992	5.98	3.31	2.5	0.39
	power grid	undirected	4 941	6 594	2.67	18.99	–	0.080
	train routes	undirected	587	19 603	66.79	2.16	–	0.69
	software packages	directed	1 439	1 723	1.20	2.42	1.6/1.4	0.082
	software classes	directed	1 377	2 213	1.61	1.51	–	0.012
	electronic circuits	undirected	24 097	53 248	4.34	11.05	3.0	0.030
	peer-to-peer network	undirected	880	1 296	1.47	4.28	2.1	0.011
Biological	metabolic network	undirected	765	3 686	9.64	2.56	2.2	0.67
	protein interactions	undirected	2 115	2 240	2.12	6.80	2.4	0.071
	marine food web	directed	135	598	4.43	2.05	–	0.23
	freshwater food web	directed	92	997	10.84	1.90	–	0.48
	neural network	directed	307	2 359	7.68	3.97	–	0.28

Source: Newman, SIAM Rev. 45, 167 (2003)

Exponent γ is indicated only if the network is **scale-free**

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Random Failure and Attack Tolerance (I)

type of impact	exponential network	scale-free network
random	robust	extreme robust
malicious attack	robust	extreme vulnerable

scale-free network:

the chance to destroy the hub with a random attack is 1:7

a malicious attack to the hub destroys the connection to six nodes

Random Failure and Attack Tolerance (II)

E*: exponential*
SF*: scale-free*

Failure*: nodes are removed randomly*
Attack*: most connected nodes are removed*

Albert, Jeong, Barabasi, Nature 406, 378, 2000

d. network diameter

f: fraction of the removed nodes

Weighted Networks

- *L* and *C* are applicable only to unweighted networks in which only the topological information on the **existence or absence of a link**, with no reference to the physical length and capacity of the link, is retained

- The model of a realistic network could be weighed to account also for the physical properties of the systems

- In addition to the adjacency matrix [a_{ij}], defined as for the unweighted graph, an additional matrix [l_{ij}] of **weights**, e.g. physical distances, failure/accident probabilities, or 'electrical' distances can be introduced

- For an unweighted network, $l_{ij} = 1 = a_{ij}$ for $i \neq j$

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Physical Weights l_{ij} – Coupling between nodes

- Physical length

$$l_{ij} = length_{ij}$$

- Travel / communication time

$$l_{ij} = \tau_{ij}$$

- Link reliability $\quad p_{ij} = e^{-\lambda \cdot length_{ij}}$

$$l_{ij} = \frac{1}{p_{ij}} = e^{\lambda \cdot length_{ij}}$$

- Electric flow

$$l_{ij} = \frac{\text{average flow of all lines}}{\text{flow of line } ij}$$

Idea to construct l_{ij} : long/unreliable/weakly-loaded/slow connections will be "longer" and less likely used in shortest paths

$$d_{ij} = \min_{\gamma_{ij}} \left(\sum_{mn \in \gamma_{ij}} l_{mn} \right)$$
If weight is time, flow or length

$$d_{ij} = \min_{\gamma_{ij}} \left(\prod_{mn \in \gamma_{ij}} (l_{mn}) \right)$$
If weight is reliability

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Weighted Analysis – Efficiency Matrix ε_{ij}

- The matrix of the shortest path lengths $[d_{ij}]$ is computed on the basis of both $[a_{ij}]$ and $[l_{ij}]$: the length d_{ij} of the shortest path linking i and j in the network is the smallest sum of the weights (e.g. physical distance in case l_{xy} is the physical length of the arc linking node x and y) throughout all the possible paths from i to j.

- Assuming that the network system is parallel, i.e. that every node concurrently sends information through its edges, a **measure of efficiency** in the communication between nodes i and j can be defined, inversely proportional to the shortest distance. Thus, the network is characterized also by an efficiency matrix $[\varepsilon_{ij}]$, whose entry is the efficiency in the communication between nodes i and j:

$$\varepsilon_{ij} = \frac{1}{d_{ij}} \quad \text{if there is at least one path connecting } i \text{ and } j$$
$$= 0 \quad \text{otherwise } (d_{ij} = \infty)$$

Network Characteristics: Efficiency ε_{ij}

• Find the efficiency matrix ε_{ij} for these undirected **<u>unweighted</u>** graphs:


$d_1 \, d_2 \, d_3 \, d_4$

$$
\begin{array}{c}
d_1 \\ d_2 \\ d_3 \\ d_4
\end{array}
\begin{pmatrix}
0 & 2 & 2 & 1 \\
2 & 0 & 2 & 1 \\
2 & 2 & 0 & 1 \\
1 & 1 & 1 & 0
\end{pmatrix}
\qquad
\begin{pmatrix}
0 & 2 & 1 & 1 \\
2 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 1 & 0 & 2 \\
1 & 1 & 2 & 0
\end{pmatrix}
\qquad
\begin{pmatrix}
0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
1 & 1 & 1 & 0
\end{pmatrix}
$$

$\varepsilon_1 \, \varepsilon_2 \, \varepsilon_3 \, \varepsilon_4$

$$
\begin{array}{c}
\varepsilon_1 \\ \varepsilon_2 \\ \varepsilon_3 \\ \varepsilon_4
\end{array}
\begin{pmatrix}
0 & 0.5 & 0.5 & 1 \\
0.5 & 0 & 0.5 & 1 \\
0.5 & 0.5 & 0 & 1 \\
1 & 1 & 1 & 0
\end{pmatrix}
\qquad
\begin{pmatrix}
0 & 0.5 & 1 & 1 \\
0.5 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 1 & 0 & 0.5 \\
1 & 1 & 0.5 & 0
\end{pmatrix}
\qquad
\begin{pmatrix}
0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
1 & 1 & 1 & 0
\end{pmatrix}
$$

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Global and Local Efficiency

- **Global efficiency**
~ Characteristic path length *L*

$$E_{glob}(G) = \frac{\sum\limits_{i \neq j \in G} \varepsilon_{ij}}{N(N-1)} = \frac{\sum\limits_{i \neq j \in G} \frac{1}{d_{ij}}}{N(N-1)}$$

- **Efficiency of the subgraph *G_i* of the neighborhood of node *i***
~ Clustering coefficient *C_i*

$$E(G_i) = \frac{\sum\limits_{n \neq m \in G_i} \varepsilon_{nm}}{k_i(k_i-1)}$$

- **Local efficiency**
~ Clustering coefficient *C*

$$E_{loc}(G) = \frac{1}{N} \sum\limits_{i \in G} E(G_i)$$

Vulnerability to Element Removal

Swiss 220/380 kV Power Network

# Vulnerability Index for Links

- Degradation of the global efficiency of the network due to the disconnection of a set of its links

$$V^* = \frac{E_{glob}(G) - E_{glob}(G^*)}{E_{glob}(G)}$$

- *G*: original network

- *G**: network after the disconnection of a link

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Swiss 220/380 kV Power Network

Swiss 220/380 kV transmission system

N = 161 nodes (substations)

K = 219 edges (overhead lines)

$$\begin{bmatrix}
0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0
\end{bmatrix}$$

- l_{ij} weight matrix = 1 / p_{ij} (link reliability)
  (λ: failure rate per unit length)

$$p_{ij} = e^{-\lambda \cdot length_{ij}}$$

- Most reliable path (Floyd iterative algorithm)

$$d_{ij} = \min_{\gamma_{ij}}\left(\frac{1}{\prod_{mn \in \gamma_{ij}} p_{mn}}\right)$$

Degree, Shortest Paths, Efficiencies

	Topological efficiency	Reliability efficiency
Global efficiency, $E_{\text{glob}}(G)$	20.5×10^{-2}	9.30×10^{-2}
Local efficiency, $E_{\text{loc}}(G)$	7.89×10^{-2}	4.72×10^{-2}

Most Vulnerable Lines - Reliability Weight

- Chamoson 02 – Riddes 02
- Breite S2 – Breite P1
- Beznau S1 – Breite P1
- Flumenthal P1 – Goesgen P1
- Goesgen P1 – Ormalingens S1

No differences in results between unweighted and reliability approach (because the reliability of a line is a function of its length)

Swiss 220/380 kV transmission system

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
Reliability + Electric Flow Weight

p_{mn}: link reliability
(λ: failure rate per unit length)

Reliability weight

$$l_{mn}^{reliability} = \frac{1}{p_{mn}} = e^{+\lambda \cdot length_{mn}}$$

Electric flow weight

$$e_{mn} = \frac{\text{average flow of line } mn}{\text{average flow of all lines}}$$

$$l_{mn}^{electric} = \frac{\text{average flow of all lines}}{\text{average flow of line } mn}$$

$$d_{ij} = \min_{\gamma_{ij}} \left(\prod_{mn \in \gamma_{ij}} \left(l_{mn}^{reliability} \cdot l_{mn}^{electric} \right) \right) = \min_{\gamma_{ij}} \left(\frac{1}{\prod_{mn \in \gamma_{ij}} \left(p_{mn} \cdot e_{mn} \right)} \right)$$

Most reliable path between *i* and *j* combined with the carried electric flow

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Most Vulnerable Lines - Reliability + Electric Flow Weight

- Goesgen S1 – Laufenburg 01
- Laufenburg 01- Laufenburg K1
- Beznau S2 – Breite S2
- Lavorgo S1 – Mettlen P1
- Sils P1 – Y/Punt S1

<u>Beznau S2 – Breite S2</u> connection is among the most vulnerable ones in any case.

Two of the five most vulnerable lines in the <u>Reliability + Electric Flow case</u> are also the first and the third most loaded lines.

Swiss 220/380 kV transmission system

Comparison with Agent-Based+ Power Flow Modeling (I)

- Agents with state charts and analytical functions
  - Generators
  - Loads
  - Busbars
  - Transmission Line
  - Operator/Dispatcher

- Interactions
  - Physical Dependencies (node injections and line flows)
  - Human behavior (dispatch of the power system)

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
Comparison with Agent-Based+ Power Flow Modeling (II)

Most vulnerable lines

This much sophisticated model contains:

- Power flow equations (more than structure topology as in Complex Networks)

- Power exchange through Country boundaries

- Event-driven simulation, i.e. operational dynamics, line disconnection, operator actions

But requires more **data** and **computational resources**

Measures of Topological Centralities in Networks

Italian 380 kV Power Network

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Centrality Measures

- Rely on topological information to qualify the importance of a network element

- Quantify the relevance of the element's location in the network with respect to a given network performance

- Originated in social network analysis, they qualify the role played by an element in the complex interaction and communication occurring in the network

- Classical topological centrality measures are: degree centrality, closeness centrality, betweenness centrality and information centrality

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Measures of Topological Centrality in Networks (I)

1. Topological degree centrality, C^D

$$C_i^D = \frac{k_i}{N-1} = \frac{\sum\limits_{j \neq i \in G} a_{ij}}{N-1}$$

Highest importance to the node with the largest number of first neighbors

2. Topological closeness centrality, C^C

$$C_i^C = \frac{N-1}{\sum\limits_{j \neq i \in G} d_{ij}}$$

Identify the nodes which on average need fewer steps to communicate with the other nodes

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Measures of Topological Centrality in Networks (II)

3. Topological betweenness centrality, C^B

$$C_i^B = \frac{1}{(N-1)(N-2)} \sum_{j,k \in G, \, j \neq k \neq i} \frac{n_{jk}(i)}{n_{jk}}$$

A node is central if it is traversed by many of the shortest paths connecting pairs of nodes

4. Topological information centrality, C^I

$$C_i^I = \frac{\Delta E(i)}{E} = \frac{E[G] - E[G^*(i)]}{E[G]}$$

Relates a node importance to the ability of the network to respond to the deactivation of the node

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Network Characteristics: Betweeness Centrality

• Find the betweenness centrality of node 4, C^B_4, in this undirected graph.

$$C_i^B = \frac{1}{(N-1)(N-2)} \sum_{j,k \in G, \, j \neq k \neq i} \frac{n_{jk}(i)}{n_{jk}}$$

n_{jk} number of shortest paths from node j to node k

a₁ a₂ a₃ a₄

$$\begin{array}{c}\mathbf{a_1}\\\mathbf{a_2}\\\mathbf{a_3}\\\mathbf{a_4}\end{array}\begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

$n_{jk}(i)$ number of shortest paths from node j to node k which pass through node i

d₁ d₂ d₃ d₄

$$\begin{array}{c}\mathbf{d_1}\\\mathbf{d_2}\\\mathbf{d_3}\\\mathbf{d_4}\end{array}\begin{pmatrix} 0 & 2 & 2 & 1 \\ 2 & 0 & 2 & 1 \\ 2 & 2 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

Application to the Italian 380 kV Power Network

N=127 nodes, *K*=342 links

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
Topological Centralities of Substations

Only shortest paths between
generating substation (blue nodes)
and load substations (black nodes)
are considered

Degree Centrality, C^D

Closeness Centrality, C^C

Betweenness Centrality, C^B

Information Centrality, C^I

Different Types of Analysis

Network static structure analysis

- Topological analysis
- Weighted analysis

Dynamic modeling of cascading failures propagation in network systems

- Identification of cascade-safe operating margins
- Criticality indicators in failure cascade processes

Single system

Systems of systems

Flow-based failure propagation

General Classification

- Common Cause Failures (CCF): multiple failures that result directly from a single common or shared root cause
  - Extreme environmental conditions
  - Failure of a piece of hardware external to the system
  - Human Error (operational or maintenance)

  e.g. fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant (1975)

- Cascading Failures: several component share a common load → 1 component failure may lead to increase load on the remaining ones → increased likelihood of failure

  e.g. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jj_K6bGQIfM

  e.g. 2003 northeast Blackout

2003 US Northeast Blackout

1. Software bug in GE energy management systems
2. Inadequate right-of-way for power lines
3. Poor coordination among TSO
4. Poor maintenance (Eastlake, Ohio generating plant shuts down)

Estimated 10 million people in Ontario and 45 million people in eight U.S. states

Electric Power Supply Systems: Recent Major Blackouts

Systemic stress, e.g. high loading condition

⬇

Local event, e.g. line flashover

⬇

Systemic effect, i.e. cascading failure

| Blackout		Load loss (GW)	Duration (h)	People affected	Main causes
Aug 14, 2003	Great Lakes, NYC	∼60	∼16	50 million	Inadequate right-of-way maintenance, EMS failure, poor coordination among neighboring TSOs
Aug 28, 2003	London	0.72	1	500,000	Incorrect line protection device setting
Sept 23, 2003	Denmark/Sweden	6.4	∼7	4.2 million	Two independent component failures (not covered by N-1 rule)
Sept 28, 2003	Italy	∼30	up to 18	56 million	High load flow CH-I, line flashovers, poor coordination among neighboring TSOs
July 12, 2004	Athens	∼9	∼3	5 million	Voltage collapse
May 25, 2005	Moscow	2.5	∼4	4 million	Transformer fire, high demand leading to overload conditions
June 22, 2005	Switzerland (railway supply)	0.2	∼3	200,000 passengers	Non-fulfillment of the N-1 rule, wrong documentation of line protection settings, inadequate alarm processing
Aug 14, 2006	Tokyo	?	−5	0.8 million households	Damage of a main line due to construction work
Nov 4, 2006	Western Europe ("controlled" line cut off)	∼14	∼2	15 million households	High load flow D-NL, violation of the N-1 rule, poor inter TSO–coordination
Nov 10, 2009	Brazil, Paraguay	∼14	∼4	60 million	Short circuit on key power line due to bad weather, Itaipu hydro plant (18 GW) shut down

Flow-based Failure Propagation

Initial load L_j = # shortest paths along node j

Node capacity $C_j = (1+\alpha) \cdot L_j$

Tolerance parameter: operating margin allowing safe operations of component *j* under possible load increments

Attack: removal of most congested component

Shortest path evaluation

$L_j > C_j$

NO → End

YES → *j* is removed

Redistribution of the shortest paths

[A.E. Motter and Y.-C. Lai 2002]

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# Cascading Failures in Power Transmission Networks

N_G = 30 generators

N_D = 97 distribution substations

K = 171 transmission lines

- Assumption: (I) power routed through the MOST DIRECT PATH from generator i and substation j

- Assumption: (II) each distribution substation j can receive power from ANY generator i

L_j load on substation j = number of shortest paths <u>connecting</u> <u>every generator to every distributor</u> passing through j
i.e. node j betweenness

Identification of Cascade-Safe Operating Margins

Removal of most congested node: worst case scenario

Islanding: failure of weak nodes splits the network into two isolated sections, reducing the loads and stabilizing the network

$$C_L = 1 - \frac{1}{N_D} \sum_{i=1}^{N_D} N_G^i / N_G$$

Connectivity loss: decrease of the ability of distribution substations to receive power from the generators

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Cascade Evolution

Due to islanding effect, increasing the tolerance causes worst effects

Model Features

- The service is routed through the shortest path
- Therefore, the initial loading condition is dictated by the network structure (topology) (node specialization is yet possible)
- Long-distance effects as a result of a single propagation step due to the redistribution of shortest paths
- The cascade-triggering event is the removal of one/few component
- Discrete time steps for the propagation of the cascade
- Congestion is modeled by the increasing loading conditions

Applications

- Modeling abstract flow-dependent cascades in:
  - power transmission grids
  - communication networks
  - fluid supply networks
  - supply chain networks

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